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Since the Wills Act 1837 a will made 
before marriage has been revoked by a subsequent marriage by 
the provisions of section 18 of that Act which state, 
"Every will made by a man or woman shall be rev-
oked by his or her marriage (except a will made 
in exercise of a power of appointment, when the 
real or personal estate thereby appointed would 
not in default of such appointment pass to his 
or her heir, customary heir, executor, or admin-
istrator, or the person entitled as his or her 
next of kin under the Statute of Distributions). " 
These provisions replaced the situation 
at Common Law (as exemplified in Marston v. Roe (1)) where a 
will made before marriage was only revoked if the.re were issue 
from the marriage, this rule being to protect the issues' 
rights as heirs from being deprived of property that the 
father may have assigned before his marriage that should have 
been rightfully theirs. 
That the Statute should bring the time of 
the revocation of the will forward to the time of marriage is 
unusual in that it represents a growing protection of a 
woman's rights by ensuring that her marriage and her position 
as a potential inheritor as a wife were formally recognised 
in the law, and that any pre-marital disposition her husband 
had made had no effect. Thus if her husband had given his 
entire estate away to beneficiaries other than his wife 
before his marriage such dispositions now became void and 
the possibility that the widow would be left penniless became 
remote. Yet this protection came at a time when a woman's 
will was automatically revoked by marriage because of the 
Common Law rule that a married woman could not make a will. 
In England as time progressed the Law 
eventually recognised the right of a woman to receive property 
and the possibility that some wills were made in contemplation 
of marriage and by section 177 of the Law of Property Act 
1925 finally permitted the testator greater freedom in the 
ante-nuptial disposition of his property. Section 177 stated 
that a will made in contemplation of marriage was not revoked 
by the solemnisation of the marriage contemplated but the will 
had to state that it was expressly made in the contemplation 
of a marriage. 
A similar provision was added to the 
New Zealand law by section 7 (1) of:. the Law Reform Act 1944, 
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now section 13 (1) of the Wills Amendment Act 1955. The 
section reads, 
"Notwithstanding anything in section eighteen 
of the principal Act (which provides that every 
will made by a man or a woman shall be revoked 
by his or her marriage) or any other enactment 
or rule of law, a will expressed to be made in 
contemplation of a marriage shall not be revoked 
by the solenmisation of the marriage contemplated." 
THE FACTS IN PUBLIC TRUSTEE V. CRAWLEY (1973) 1 N.Z.L.R. 695. 
The case was a recent action for probate 
in solemn form of Mr. Crawley's will. Mr. Crawley had made a 
will on the 20th of November 1959 devising all his property 
to" my fiancee Bunny Rameka of Opua aforesaid." The testator 
married Miss Rameka on the 19th of May 1960. The marriage 
lasted for 10 years and was dissolved on the 27th April 1970. 
Mr. Crawley died on the 21st of June 1970 some two months 
after the marriage had been dissolved. 
The issue which the Court had to decide 
was whether the bequest " to my_,)?-iancee 
II was a will expressed 
to be made in contemplation of a marriage. 
The importance of the validity of the 
will to Mrs. Crawley can be seen; if the will was invalid 
because of automatic revocation Mr. Crawley would die intestate 
and Mrs. Crawley would not succeed to any of his property 
because she was no longer his wife, whereas if the will stood 
she would inherit all her ex-husband's property. 
AUTHORITY PRIOR TO PUBLIC TRUSTEE V. CRAWLEY: 
In Re Langston (2) in 1953 the facts were 
that the testator had left all his property" to my fiancee 
M.E.B." and had appointed her as sole executrix to his estate. 
The testator's will had been made on November 7th 1935 and 
his marriage with his fiancee was solemnised on the 7th 
January 1936. Davies J. in opening his judgment said, 
"Counsel has cited to me three cases on which 
I am satisfied that as a matter of law I can some 
to a decision which I feel gives effect to what 
the testator would undoubtedly have desired. 
11 
( 3) 
The first of these cases which had been 
cited was Pilot v. Gainfort (4). The facts in this case were 
that the testator's wife had disappeared. In her absence he set 
up house with another woman and after three years had made out 
a will in her favour, the material part of which was, 
11 I hereby bequeath and leave to Diana Featherstone 
Pilot my wife all my worldly goods." 
Four years after making this will he 
married her. Lord Merrivale in holding the will valid said, 
"I do not think it can be doubted that the will 
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was in contemplation of marriage and pract
ically 
expresses that contemplation and is good."
 (5). 
The next case Davies J. considered was 
Sallis v. Jones (6) in which it was held t
hat general words 
at the end of a will expressing it to have
 been made in 
contemplation of a marriage were insuffici
ent to relate it 
to the particular marriage contemplated an
d were thus insuff-
icient to save the will from revocation on
 the solemnisation 
of the marriage. This case he concluded wa
s correctly decided 
on the point that section 13 (1) only oper
ated when the will 
was expressed to be made in contemplation 
of a particular 
marriage, and in that case there had been 
a declaration that 
the will had been made in contemplation of
 marriage and 
nothing more. 
The final case he considered was an 
unreported decision in 1944 in England, In
 Re Knight. In this 
case the testator had left all his estate 
to" my future wife 
11 
and it had been held that the will was not
 revoked by the 
solemnisation of the marriage. Davies J. u
sed this decision 
as a direct supporting authority for holdin
g Mr. Langston's 
will to be valid. 
From the three above-mentioned cases Davie
s 
J. drew the following test: Does the testa
tor express the fact 
that he is contemplating marriage to a par
ticular person? 
He then held that in leaving his estate to
" my fiancee M.E.B." 
the testator had done so. This is the law 
as it stands today 
in England. 
iJe move now to two Australian decisions. 
In Re Taylor (7) the facts were almost ide
ntical to those in 
Pilot v. Gainfort (supra). The testator ha
d left his property 
to his wife at a time when they had not ye
t been married. 
O'Bryan J. refused to follow Pilot's case 
saying, 
11 It is not an uncommon thing for a man to d
escribe 
a woman with whom he is living as ' my wife
 ' and 
attribute to her liis name." 
If extrinsic evidence could have been 
admitted the testator's contemplation of m
arriage would have 
been proved but O'Bryan J. would not permi
t extrinsic evidence 
to be admitted and reluctantly held the wi
ll revoked, and 
suggested an amendment to the law. 
(1). Marston v. Roe (1838) 112 E.R. 742. 
(2). In Re Langston (1953) P. 100. 
(3) Supra 
(4). Pilot v. Gainfort (1931) P. 103. 
(5). Supra 
-----
(6) Sallis v. Jones (1936) P. 43. 
(7) In Re Taylor (1949) V.L.R. 477. 
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In In Re Chase (8) the testator left his 
property by will" to Miss Valerie Gore-Yeo my 
fiancee at present 
travelling to Australia on board the ss Strathe
den due in 
Fre mantle on the 8th June 1948." The will was 
executed on the 
6th June 1948, and the marriage was solemnised
 on the 24th 
of June 1948. Miss Gore-Yeo took approximately 
two-thirds of 
the testator's estate. 
Sir Bdmund Herring C.J. after counsel had 
presented thorough reviews of the above cases 
said, 
"I have been referred to a number of authorit
ies 
but none of them is of any assistance in the 
decision of this case which has to be made on 
the language used by the testator in this will
. 
There is a difference between wife and fiancee 
in 
that the use of the latter term necessarily co
nnotes 
an intention, and amounts to describing the pe
rson 
in question as a person whom the testator inten
ds 
to marry. " ( 9) . 
The fact that the will was made in favour 
of a fiancee who was due in Fremantle in two d
ays time 
provided enough evidence to the learned judge 
of an early 
intention to marry, so the will was therefore v
alid as it was 
expressed as being in contemplation of a marria
ge. 
Before we turn to the two New Zealand 
cases we may at this point consider another rep
orted Commonwealth 
decision on the matter. In the Canadian case o
f In Re Pluto 
Estate (10) the testator left his house and co
ntents" to my 
wife M.B. Pluto." As in Pilot's case the testat
or was not married 
to the person whom he referred to in his will a
s his wife. How-
ever the marriage took place on the next day. 
The relevant 
Canadian section is section 16 of the Wills Ac
t RSBC, 1960, 
Ch. 408 which reads in part, 
"16. A will is revoked by the marriage of the 
testator except where 
(a) there is a declaration in the will that it 
is 
made in contemplation of marriage." 
The Court held that the will was revoked 
by the subsequent marriage because although an 
inference was 
to be drawn that the will was made in contempl
ation of marriage 
the inference was not enough to satisfy the wo
rds of the 
Statute, which in the opinion of Hinkson L.J.S.
C. was more 
stringent than its English counterpart. Whereas
 in the English 
Statute the will hao to be expressed to be in c
ontemplation 
of a marriage, in the Canadian Statute there ha
d to be a 
declaration in the will that it was made in con
templation of 
marriage. 
The first New Zealand case on section 
7 (1) of the Law Reform Act 1944 came in 1953 i
n Burton v. 
McGregor (11). The facts in that case were tha
t the testator 
left all his property " unto my fiancee Valerie
 Richards," and 
appointed her as sole executrix of his will. F.
B. Adams J. 
said in his judgment, 
"the purpose of the law as to revocation by 
(,} .. ,,·l,c-
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marriage is to let in the claims of w
ives and 
children and it is reasonable to supp
ose their 
claims are protected properly and adj
usted by the 
law as to intestacy. To maintain a wi
ll made before 
marriage may result in injustice to c
hildren or even 
to the wife herself, and there are go
od reasons why 
it should not be done unless the inten
tion is clearly 
expressed on the face of the will." (
12). 
In Burton's case if the widow did not
 take 
under the will she would by virtue of
 her rights as a widow 
take the whole estate under intestacy 
provisions which are now 
embodied in section 77 (l)of the Adm
inistration Act 1969. 
In holding the will invalid as not be
ing 
expressed to be in contemplation of a 
marriage Adams J. based 
his decision on the view taken in The
obald on Wills, and also 
advanced by O'Bryan J. in Taylor's ca
se namely that when the 
testator used the word" fiancee "he 
did no more than apply 
to her the name and description which 
she had acquired by 
repute and that it was impossible to 
say anything was expressed 
in the will with reference to an inten
tion to marry. Adams J. 
said, 
"By using the word fiancee it is pos
sible the 
testator intends to provide for her in
 the 
interval while she continues to be his
 fiancee and 
before she acquires the status of his 
wife and the 
rights of a widow on his death intesta
te. If it is 
possible on the wording of the will th
at the 
testator's intention was such as I hav
e described 
then it cannot in my opinion be said t
hat the will 
is expressed to be in contemplation o
f the 
intended marriage within the Statute."
 (13). 
Adams J. made mention of Lord Merriva
le's 
words in the Pilot v. Gainfort case, 
that if the wording of the 
will" practically expressed the conte
mplation "of a marriage 
then the will would not be revoked. A
dams J. then said that 
he could not rely on the words because
 they only appeared in 
the Law Reports and the Law Journal R
eports, but not in any 
of the other law reports, which simply
 quote Lord Merrivale 
as saying there could be no doubt the 
will was made in 
contemplation of marriage, with the re
sult that it was not 
revoked by the solemnisation of the m
arriage. 
An interesting point can be raised he
re 
over the existence of the words "prac
tically expresses," in 
some reports. It is possible Lord Mer
rivale may have omitted 
these words when he gave judgment ora
lly in Court, but on 
examination after the case included th
e words in his written 
judgment beforec-releasing it to the o
fficial reporters after 
realising that his oral judgment as it
 stood was outside the 
statute in that the statute required t
he will to be"expressed 
to be made in contemplation of a marr
iage," whereas all he had 
said in his oral judgment was that the
 will had been made in 
contemplation of marriage, omitting re
ference to the need for 
the will to express that fact. 
(8) In Re Chase (1957) V.L.R. 477. 
(9) Supra 477 - 478. 
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If this is so then it is understandable 
why the words II practically expresses 
II are not included in the 
unofficial reports because these are usually based 
on a 
transcript of the oral judgment given at the hearing
, and are 
published earlier than the official reports. 
he said, 
Adams J. conceded this possibility when 
11 the words "practically expresses" which are the 
only words referring to expression in the will, may 
perhaps be a correction, intended to indicate that 
the learned President did have the point in mind. 
But, even in the two reports in which those words 
appear, the quotation of the statute in the 
judgment omits the words" expressed to be." (14). 
It would appear to be quite clear from the 
above excerpt that Adams J. thought the decision in 
Pilot v. 
Gainfort was given per incuriam based on Lord Merri
vale's 
omission to consider the essential words of the sta
tute. 
As an additional ground for his decision 
in Burton v. McGregor Adams J. held that section 7 o
f the 
Law Reform Act 1944 was directed to the continued o
peration 
of the will after a subsequent marriage, and if it f
ollowed 
that if what the testator said in the will was inco
nsistent 
with a possible intention that the will should not 
operate 
after the marriage then the will was not one made in
 contem-
plation "of" the marriage within the meaning of the 
section. 
Adams J. said that the devise "unto my fiancee Val
erie 
Richards "was susceptible of the interpretation tha
t the 
testator had intended to provide for his fiancee on
ly while 
she was his fiancee, and so the subsequent marriage 
revoked 
the will. 
THE REASONING IN PUBLIC TRUSTEE V. CRAWLEY: 
In Crawley's case Mahon J. described the 
issue as "the question whether this will containing
 a gift 
' to my fiancee "is a will expressed to be in conte
mplation 
of marriage so as to be saved from revocation by sec
tion 13 (1) 
of the Wills Amendment Act 1955, which incorporates 
section 7 
of the Law Reform Act 1944." 
The learned Judge then proceeded to 
review the history of the section and the English, A
ustralian 
and New Zealand cases on the section. After drawing 
attention 
to the conflicting cases of Burton v. McGregor and I
n Re Lang-
ston he then decided to adopt the reasoning of Adams
 J. in the 
former case. 
(lO)In Re Pluto Estate (1969) 69 W.W.R. 765. 
(11). Burton v. McGregor (1953) N.Z.L.R. 487. 
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Mahon J. said, 
"To my mind, a disposition in favour of 
' my fiancee ' only establishes that a marriage 
is contemplated. It does not necessarily represent 
that the will is being made in contemplation of 
that marriage, with the concurrent intention that 
the will is to survive the marriage." (15). 
Mahon J. said it was easy to infer 
the will had been made in contemplation of marriage because 
of the fact that the testator had left the whole of his estate 
to his fiancee. But even so he did not think the inference 
strong enough to hold the will valid. He said, 
"The probabilities would favour the application 
of section 13 (1) of the Wills Amendment Act 
1955. But I do not think that the section is 
drawn so as to give effect to the probabilities 
of intention. On the contrary, the section envisages 
in my opinion an unequivocal declaration of the 
testator, the purpose of the Legislature being to 
exclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to 
prove a testamentary intention that the will 
should survive the marriage." (16). 
Mahon J. said that in . the few decided 
authorities on the revocation of a will by marriage it had 
been easy to infer that the will had been made in contemplation 
of marriage because the testator had left the whole or 
greater part of his estate to his intended wife. 
However Mahon J. saw a danger in 
applying inferences of this kind, and gave the following 
example as an illustration, 
"Suppose, however, b y way of example, that a 
testator with assets of $100,000 left $1,000 to a woman 
described as 'my fiancee ' and left $90,000 to 
his brothers and sisters. Here, the inference would 
be the other way . It would be impossible to infer 
from the contents of the will that the testator 
intended the will to operate after marriage. Y~t 
if cases such as Re Langston and Re Knight are 
rightly decided, the mere use of the phrases 
"my fiancee ' or 'my future wife 'would be 
decisive of the question, and the will in its 
entirity would be saved from revocation. In such a 
case the widow would no doubt be constrained to 
argue for an intestacy , submitting that extrinsic 
evidence should be received to establish that the 
testator only intended his bequest to her as a 
provision for the interval between execution of 
the will and marriage. The probabilities would 
certainly be in favour of that construction. But 
this is the type of enquiry which in my view the 
statute intended to exclude." (18). 
(12). Burton v. McGregor (1953) N.Z.L.R. 487, 490. 
(13). Supra 492. 
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So, in disapproving of the Re Langston 
decision and supporting Adams J. 's holding that the controll-
ing requirement of the section was not that the will be made 
in contemplation of marriage but that it be expressed to be 
made in contemplation of marriage, and also that the testam-
entary expression must convey the intention or contemplation 
of the testator that his will should operate after marriage, 
and by leaving his property 
II to my fiancee Bunny Rameka 
11 
the testator had complied with neither of these requirements, 
Mahon J. pronounced against the will and held it to have been 
revoked by marriage. 
WAS THE DECISION IN THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE V. CRAWLEY CORRECT? 
As a starting point in the examination 
of Mahon J. 's reasoning it would seem logical that we determine 
the exact definitions of the words 
II fiancee II and II expressed 
11 
as essential prerequisites to an analysis of the problem. 
"Fiancee II is defined by the shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary as 
II a betrothed person." 
"To betroth" is defined as 
II to engage 
(a woman) in contract of marriage, to affiance, to pledge or 
espouse." 
11 Express II is defined as " to portray 
or represent, to represent in language; to set forth, to give 
utterance to; to mention or specify; to state or mention 
explicitly; opp. to imply. 
11 
The shades of meaning of the verb "to 
express "illustrate how equivocal the interpretation of the 
section could be. 
On the one hand the section could be 
interpreted as II a will portraying or representing that it is 
made in contemplation of marriage," which would probably cover 
the use of the term"fiancee" but on the other hand the section 
could be construed as II a will specifying or stating explicitly 
that it was made in contemplation of marriage," which would 
probably exclude any connotation the word fiancee might reflect 
even although a fiancee might be considered as a contractual 
partner to marriage. 
On an etymological basis there is support 
for the judgments of both Adams and Mahon JJ. Their inter-
pretation of the word" expressed 
II in the statute has been a 
strict one, holding that the will must specifically state that 
it is made in contemplation of marriage. Their reasons for 
adhering to such an interpretation have been quoted already 
but briefly they have been based on the assumption that even 
if the will has been held to be invalid the wife will be taken 
care of by the Court under the intestacy provisions of the 
Administration Act, but unfortunately in the Crawley case the 
presumption that the parties would still be married at the date 
of the testator's death was erroneous. 
(14). Burton v. McGregor (1953) N.Z.L.R. 487, 489. 
(15). Public Trustee v. Crawley (1973) 1 N.Z.L.R. 695, 700. 
(16). Supra 700. 
(18). Supra 700. 
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Although Mahon J. took this factor into 
account he decided that it was wiser to keep t
he law as it stood 
by holding the will invalid rather than creati
ng an exception 
in the Crawley case because of the possible d
ifficulty married 
women would have if wills to" my fiancee "we
re held valid, 
and the original intention of the testator had
 been only to 
provide for his fiancee cluring the interval o
f their engagement 
and so had made large bequests to persons othe
r than his fiancee 
intending to make another will after marriage,
 which the wife 
would then have to contest after his death if 
there had been 
no other will made. 
Is this the way in which the section was 
meant to operate, in purely black or white ter
ms in which the 
beneficiary under the will either takes or los
es according 
to the wording of the devise without regard to
 the testator's 
intention? 
The New Zealand Parliamentary Debates offer 
little more than a discussion of the general t
erms of the section. 
The Attorney-General, the Honourable Mr. H.G.R
. Mason stated 
that the section might help remedy the situati
on where spouses 
had suffered because of their omission to exec
ute a new will 
immediately after their marriage. He said, 
"Clause 7 will be of considerable practical c
on-
venience to any person contemplating marriage 
as 
it does away with the old provision that marri
age 
revokes all wills then in existence. It follow
s the 
English provision and enables a person contem
plating 
marriage to make a valid will before the cerem
ony 
takes place, and such will then remains of ful
l 
force and effect after the particular marriage
 is 
solemnised. Up to the present time parties eit
her 
had to execute a new will immediately after th
e 
marriage ceremony or take the risk. The great 
majority preferred to take the risk, sometimes
 with 
disastrous results." (19). 
THE COURSE TAKEN IN THE WILL OF FOSS: 
If the interpretation of the word 
11 expressed II in section 13 (1) of the Wills Am
endment Act 1955 
is equivocal there is one other measure left o
pen to the Court 
to do justice between the parties. This measur
e is the 
examination by the Judge of the facts in each
 particular case. 
The weighing up of the extrinsic evidence to s
ee if the 
11 fiancee II was contemplated as a wife at the tim
e of the 
execution of the will. 
This course was followed by Helsham J. 
in In the Will of Foss. (20). 
The facts in this case were that the 
deceased had made a will at his employer's req
uest on the 
2nd of March 1956 containing the dispositive p
rovision: 
11 I give devise and bequeath all my personal 
belongings money, shares in companies, insuran
ce 
policies, and property to my wife (Mrs. P. Fos
s) . 11 
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At the time of the will's execution the 
testator had not yet married the woman he had terme
d as his 
wife in the will, however the testator married the 
woman 8 days 
later on the 10th of March 1956. 
The will was challenged under a similar 
provision in the Australian legislation to section 
13 (1) of 
the Wills Amendment Act 1955. 
In outlining the issue concerning 
evidence Helsham J. said, 
11 There can be no dispute that evidence is 
admissible as to the marital state of the deceased 
and any interested party at the date the will was 
made, and of the subsequent marriage of the decease
d. 
That brings up the matter for decision. But can the
 
Court consider any other factors, as for example, 
that the deceased was engaged to be married, whethe
r 
or not he was living with a person whom he describe
s 
in his will as his wife and whom he subsequently 
married, what time elapsed between will and marriag
e 
and so on? On this matter of evidence views have 
differed. 11 (21) . 
His Honour then outlined the distinction 
between reading a meaning into a will by extrinsic 
evidence, and 
interpreting the construction of an expression in t
he will by 
extrinsic evidence. 
11 Whilst it is correct to say that the fact that 
a marriage was contemplated must appear by some 
expression in the will itself, it is also correct 
to say that whether the will contains such an 
expression must depend upon the construction of 
the will. If the will clearly contains such an 
expression, then there is no problem. If it 
does not, but there are some words which may or 
may not amount to such an expression, then the will
 
must be construed so as to find its true meaning. 
In order to ascertain the meaning of the words 
used by the testator it is permissible to construe 
the document in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances. This is the law in relation to 
ambiguities of language used in a testamentary 
document, and applies no less to the aspect of 
whether a testator has expressed the fact that 
his marriage was contemplated as to any other. 
For limited purposes the Probate Court has 
always been a court of construction, one purpose 
being to ascertain whether a will should be 
admitted to Prol.late. (22). 
If the question is a matter of construction, then 
as Lord Cairns said, "The Court has a right to 
ascertain all the facts which were known to the 
testator at the time he made his will, and thus 
to place itself in the testator's position, in orde
r 
to ascertain the bearing and application he uses, 
in f ---
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and in order to ascertain whether there exists 
any person or thing to which the whole descrip
t-
ion given in the will can be, reasonably and w
ith 
sufficient certainty applied." (23) 
The only reported instance of a Judge in 
New Zealand accepting extrinsic evidence in th
is area is in 
Re Natusch , Pettit ahd Others v. Natusch (1963)
 N.Z.L. R . 273. 
In this case the testator by his will had 
given the whole of his estate to trustees for 
sale and conversion, 
and apart from two small legacies payable only 
on certain 
contingencies, had directed his trustees to sta
nd possessed 
of the residue for his "intended wife Peggy M
oir Ford." 
There followed in the will a declaration that 
the will was made 
"in anticipation of my intended marriage to th
e said Peggy 
Moir Ford." 
At the date of the testator's death Mrs. 
Ford was still married to Mr. Ford but had been
 separated from 
him for sufficient time to give grounds for div
orce. lJo divorce 
had been obtained however. 
Counsel for the defendants (who were bene-
ficiaries under an earlier will) contended tha
t the will was a 
conditional or contingent will, the purpose of 
the will being 
to effect a benefit to Mrs. Ford only if and w
hen the contempl-
ated marriage eventuated. In the course of his 
judgment McGregor 
J. said, 
"There do not seem to me to be any other indic
ia 
in the will to assist in its construction. Both
 
counsel requesteg me to hear extrinsic evidence
 
to assist in ascertaining the intention of the 
testator. In view of the agreement on this mat
ter, 
although I had doubts as to the admissibility o
f 
such evidence I agreed to accept evidence of th
is 
nature." (25). 
The existence of an agreement between 
counsel and McGregor J.'s hesitancy in admittin
g the evidence 
does not make Natusch a strong supporting auth
ority for a 
New Zealand Court to go further and follow the 
course taken in 
Foss's case. 
COMMENTARY: 
The present New Zealand authorities hold 
that a will expressed to be made in contemplati
on of a particular 
marriage is not revoked by the marriage concern
ed, but that a will 
made in contemplation of marriage expressed to 
be made in favour 
of" my fiancee" is revoked by the marriage. T
his dichotemy in 
my view <loes not have a justifiable foundation 
in fact, law or 
in the element of public policy concerned. 
, ,; 't., :;, ' . y -; •• ,.,, '- ., • ' ' t1f • l I ~ ' • I ,J- . .. 1 ' ' ' • - 7,L. ' · 1 . ( J ', ... • 'l/ , • ' ' .,. I \ ,.;.. ~ 
\ ~ • • - , • . : I ·~ , , .-' 
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FACT: 
Any student of etymology would recognise 
that words may have different connotations. "F
iancee "is a word 
to which can be attached two important shades o
f meaning. Firstly 
it may be a name colourlessly attributed to a p
erson after the 
manner of the words "sister, mother etc." pur
ely as a matter 
of description. Secondly the use of the word" 
fiancee "by the 
testator would readily be taken by most people 
to be tantamount 
to an affirmation that the testator proposes to
 marry the woman 
so described. 
It would appear that in both Burton and 
Crawley the testators included the word" fianc
ee II as an indicat-
ion that they were making their wills in contem
plation of their 
respective marriages. Should the Court have rec
ognised this fact? 
LAW 
As a matter of law Sim J. in the Court of 
Appeal felt he was bound to recognise the use 
of words in their 
popular sense by a testator (26). Two women co
ntested a will in 
which the testator had left his property to his
 wife. One of the 
women was the testator's de facto wife, the oth
er was his de jure 
wife. Sim J. received evidence which, 
"makes it clear that in the later will he (the
 
testator) used the expression "my wife" in it
s 
secondary or popular sense to denote his de fac
to 
wife, and not the person who might claim to be 
his 
de jure wife." (27). 
In admitting a will to Probate the 
Court may act as a Court of construction. If a
ll the aspects of 
a will indicate that the testator used the exp
ression "fiancee" 
as indicating he was making a will in contempl
ation of marriage 
the Court should set about construing the will 
by receiving 
evidence to see if this was the testator's und
isputed intention. 
As expreesed by Lord Cairns, 
"The Court has a right to ascertain all the fa
cts 
which were known to the testator at the time he
 made 
his will, and thus to place itself in the testa
tor's 
position, in order to ascertain the bearing and
 
application he uses, and in order to ascertain 
whether there exists any person or thing to wh
ich the 
whole description given in the will can be, rea
sonably 
and with sufficient certainty applied." (28). 
If the facts show that the testator made 
the will in contemplation of marriage, ie that 
he used the term 
11 fiancee, 11 left his fiancee the bulk of his esta
te, and subsequently 
married her, the Court should be prepared to ac
cept extrinsic 
evidence in support of the expressed terms of t
he will to show 
that the will was made in contemplation of mar
riage, and should 
be allowed to operate after marriage. 
I 
in 
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PUBLIC POLICY: 
As Adams J. said, the provision in the 
Wills Act revoking all wills on marriage was inserted, 
"to let in the claims of wives and children 
and it is reasonable to suppose their claims are 
protected properly and adjusted by the law as to 
intestacy. To maintain a will made before marriage 
may result in injustice to children or even to 
the wife herself, and there are good reasons why 
it should not be done unless the intention is 
clearly expressed on the face of the will." (29). 
It may be pointed out that at Common Law 
the claims of children were already provided for by the rule 
that a pre-marital will was revoked on there being issue from 
the marriage. The provision was actually for the greater 
protection of a wife's rights. By refusing to follow the 
testator's expressed intention in the "fiancee "wills, the 
Courts are opening the way to serious possible effects on a 
wife's rights to inherit. 
If the wife cannot take under a will because 
it is invalid, the intestacy provisions of the Administration Act 
1969 usually govern the distribution of the testator's estate. 
Section 77 of the Administration Act provides that when a 
person dies intestate, leaving issue, the surviving spouse 
takes the personal chattels and $12,000 out of the estate, and 
then takes one third of the rest of the estate. The provisions 
of the Administration Act are totally different to the provisions 
of a testator who leaves his whole estate, as in Burton and 
Crawley, to his fiancee. In the Crawley case Mrs. Crawley could 
receive nothing under the intestacy provisions because she was 
not longer Mr. Crawley' s wife, al though the original will was 
still in existence. 
If the estate is one of reasonable size 
and the issue of the marriage are adult then it is possible 
a wife may find herself reduced to a financial status never 
intended by her deceased spouse. For example if the estate 
was worth $100,000, the wife would receive a total of about 
$40,000 under the intestacy provisions, which does not take into 
account any death duties payable on the estate. She has barely 
enough to buy a house and maintain herself for 5 years on this 
figure. This is hardly a situation which protects the wife's 
rights as intended by the statute. If on the other hand the 
pre-marital will was held valid the surviving spouse would be 
gaining the bulk of the estate in accordance with the testator's 
wishes. Yet of the two alternatives the Courts have opted for 
the former in New Zealand. 
It is my submission that when the 
Legislature enabled testators to make wills to be expressed to 
be in contemplation of a marriage they intended the provision 
only for a testator's convenience, and intended the provision 
to operate where the testator indicated that he had made the will 
in contemplation of marriage. I submit that in both Burton and 
Crawley the testators did evidence such intentions, and did 
express their intentions in their use of the word" fiancee." 
I submit that thE\Ji~ttfrht~ffilvertlftyifH Re Chase and In the Will of Foss 
\ ' l!l!';:,ti.,i1 
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are preferable to the New Zealand authorities because the former 
do more justice to the intention of the section and to the 
parties involved. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 18 of the Wills Act 1837 states: 
"Every will made by a man or woman shall be 
revoked by his or her marriage •. " 
Section 13 (1) of the Wills Amendment 
Act 1955 states: 
"Notwithstanding anything in section 18 of the 
principal Act or any other enactment or rule of 
law, a will expressed to be made in contemplation 
of a marriage shall not be revoked by the 
solemnisation of the marriage contemplated." 
The New Zealand authorities of Burton v. 
McGregor and Public Trustee v. Crawley hold that a will made by 
a testator before his marriage to" my fiancee "is not expressed 
to be made in contemplation of a marriage, and is therefore 
revoked on the solemnisation of the marriage. 
It is my submission for the reasons 
outlined in this paper that such wills should come within the 
meaning of section 13 (1) and should be valid after that marriage. 
< 
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